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- [Session 7] Russia’s Leade...
- Rebecca Graebner, The Heritage Foundation
Kim Jiseon, Ewha Womens University
Next month, Vladimir Putin will begin his third term as President of Russia. He will trade positions with the current president, Dmitry Medvdev, who will replace Putin as Prime Minister. The panelists elaborated on how changes in Russian leadership could affect foreign policy and relations between Russia and its neighbors.
George Kunadze argued that even with the change in leadership, relations with North East Asia will be low priority to Russia. The new Putin regime will initially be preoccupied with domestic issues, and any foreign policy, he argued, will focus on those countries that express concern with Russia’s path to democracy. Neighbors in North East Asia will not be of specific interest. China and Japan are both engaged in their own struggles and North Korea continues to be a problem that can be put off until the Middle East crisis is settled. Conversely, China, Japan, and Korea, have little interest in the Russian democracy.
Iwashita Akihiro discussed relations between Russia and Asian countries after Putin’s victory. As for Russia-Japan relations, he argued that the impact of Putin’s re-election would be limited because Putin declared the same policy as he did six years ago. Russia continues building business-oriented relations with Japan, and the two countries may attempt to resolve several issues such as energy and maritime security. According to Iwashita, even though the relationship between China and Russia is considered positive, focus should be on sensitive factors, such as territorial disputes. China was granted control over two islands and approximately 50% of Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island (Heixiazi Island). China is constructing infrastructure on its side of the island, but the Russian side has lagged behind in terms of development, which shows the isolation of Russia in the region.
Han Byung-Jin argued that Putin’s new presidency showed his strong presence in the Russian government and political circles. Even though protests broke out against the election, Putin is in a strong position. The stable political circumstances of Russia will allow the Putin administration to focus on Central Asia and Northeast Asia. According to Han, Putin’s re-election will be beneficial to North Korea. North Korea relies on the Special Economic Zone in the northern part to mitigate economic difficulties, and China also has interests in developing this region. Russia will consider involvement if China and North Korea begin to develop the region. Due to Putin’s strong presidential power, Russia will be able to implement long-term strategies and invest in developing the border area.
Andrey Ivanov spoke on Russia’s struggle to find its place within the Asia-Pacific region. Growing competition between China and the U.S. has fueled Russia’s desire for new Asia-Pacific cooperation; however, other countries have not viewed these ideas as either interesting or necessary. Russian experts dispel these ideas of “new models,” favoring the strengthening of current structures. Russia has large potential for development, but this also means potential for great destabilization. Ivanov argued that Russia should offer opportunities for investment and cooperation honestly and be willing to compromise. By strengthening ties with neighbors and attracting investment within its own borders, Russia is certain to find its place in the Asia-Pacific.
- [Session 7] Trade and Secu...
- Matthew Jensen, American Enterprise Institute
Kim Kyungtae, Seoul National University
The United States’ first bilateral trade agreement of the modern era was with Israel, a country of limited economic importance at the time, but significant strategic importance. Dr. Claude Barfield, an economist at the American Enterprise Institute and the moderator of this panel, offered this example to describe how trade and security are inextricably linked. There is some concern that security issues “pollute” the economic discourse and hinder the implementation of optimal trade policy. The consensus on the panel, however, is that the link between trade and security is unavoidable, and may even be beneficial.
Dr. Ahn Dukgeun, professor of Trade Law and Policy at Seoul National University, provided a discussion of the legal aspects of the trade-security nexus. Article 21 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) codified exemptions so that countries could protect their essential security interests. The conditions to invoke the article, however, are ambiguous. Member nations can utilize the clause if the nation itself claims an essential security issue, but it is unclear whether, in the case of dispute, what entity has jurisdiction. If the Security Council of the United Nations makes a resolution on the issue, the WTO would accept the decision, but the problem still exists if the council does not operate effectively or does not make such a resolution.
Trade policy is not only influenced by security issues, but can be wielded tactically for security purposes through sanctions, as Dr. Ahn alluded. There can be unintended consequences to the use of sanctions, however. Dr. John Park, of the U.S. Institute of Peace, noted that when one country creates sanctions, other countries may fill the vacuum. In this way, coalitions can coalesce around sanctioned countries. To some extent this is happening in the case of Iran.
Professor Xiong Lili, of the University of International Business and Economics, discussed the security and economic benefits that may stem from wider adoption of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Particularly, adoption of the TPP might create deeper economic integration between countries across the Asia Pacific region and align political and security goals. It would also be more efficient than the current “noodle bowl” of bilateral and “mini-lateral” FTAs. Finally, an expanded TPP could level the playing field for US exports to Asian markets and might ease US trade imbalance, releasing some US?China tension. These benefits might not accrue for 10, 25, or more years, but that is but a blink of history’s eye.
The conventional logic is that there is a positive correlation between trade and security, with causation flowing in both directions. Professor Lee Chung Min, Dean of the Graduate school of International Studies at Yonsei University, argues that this logic does not entirely apply to the Asia Pacific Region. The rivalry between China and the United States, unlike Cold War rivalries, is characterized by significant trade flows between regions. This means that as insecurity develops between China and the United States, each country attempts to build coalitions through trade policy and the conventional logic is turned on its head.
As the United States pivots to the Asia Pacific and comes into even closer contact with China, it is likely that trade and security issues will grow in importance. This will affect trade between large economies and will likely play a greater role in development efforts.
- [Session 7] The 2012 Seoul...
- Sung-Yeon Kweon, Korea University
Sunkyo Hong, Korea University
“We are going to discuss the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and see what kind of homework and tasks are ahead of us.” Having thus defined the panel topic, moderator Jun Bong-Geun turned the discussion to the panelists.
The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) took place on March 26 ? 27, 2012. As South Korea’s Sous-Sherpa, Hahn Choong-hee was happy to report the Summit’s three pillars of achievement. First, over 30 countries had met more than 70 commitments made at the 2010 Washington NSS. Secondly, many new commitments were made at the Summit, including almost 100 specific commitments on an individual nation basis and sets of collective gift baskets, which involve cooperation among groups of like-minded countries on areas such as information security and counter-smuggling. Third, the Seoul NSS communique outlines 11 specific tasks each with a specific action plan. To build on the momentum of the Summit’s success in nuclear security, it is necessary to set standards and establish mechanisms.
Han Yong Sup spoke of South Korea’s successful role in the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. The country played an important role as an honest broker and facilitator in the agenda of the globalizing world. Moreover, the government reached out to enhance the awareness of nuclear security issues among the public. During the Summit, the Korean government made almost 100 commitments and exhibited creativity in adding relevant items to the Summit agenda. Three problems remain, however, according to Professor Han. The Summit has faded in the public’s memory, so effort must continue to be put forth. Russia and the U.S. should take the leading role in the future NSS since the two countries possess most of the world’s nuclear materials. Finally, while the NSS has dealt with the supply side of nuclear security, the demand on the side of terrorists must be addressed.
For Kenneth Luongo, the 2012 Summit was successful because of the participation of more than 50 states and the broadening of the scope of nuclear security with the inclusion of the safety-security interface and radiological issues. Unfortunately, despite its importance, the issue of what the nuclear security regime is and should be was not included on the agenda. Nuclear security governance is underdeveloped, and the problem lies in an imbalance between sovereignty and global responsibilities in favor of sovereignty. A rebalancing requires promoting transparency of action, improving regime cohesion and standards, and building international confidence in the nuclear security regime.
Corey Hinderstein offered three points. First, the Seoul Summit made more progress than recognized, moved backward in the area of transparency, and exposed some of the weaknesses of the process. Second, she offered three suggestions to realistically improve the process between now and the planned 2014 NSS. These were to broaden the scope of nuclear security to include diversion and sabotage; to introduce a process to effectively integrate the diplomatic, industry, and expert communities; and to specifically define a purpose for the centers of excellence that the United States, China, India, Japan, and South Korea committed to establish to train nuclear site personnel. The final point was to improve transparency, public education, and to build capacity in states to deal with the nuclear security issue.
